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ABSTRACT:  
We study the apparent disconnect between what countries announce to be their exchange rate 
regime and what they de facto implement. Even though discrepancies between announcements 
and de facto polices are frequent, there is a lack of understanding of actual patterns and 
underlying reasons. We contribute to the literature by identifying a number of robust stylized 
facts by means of an in-depth analysis of a large cross-country dataset. A key insight is that 
countries that operate under intermediate de facto regimes tend to announce fixed or flexible 
exchange rate regimes. The exact nature of deviations is related to country characteristics such as 
trade structure, financial development, and financial openness. Furthermore, regime discrepan-
cies have followed secular trends, which are most likely related to financial globalization and 
changes in monetary policy design.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A look at the exchange rate regime choices of 133 countries over the period 1973-2004 reveals a 
striking phenomenon: nearly one half of all observations (40 per cent) show inconsistencies 
between what countries officially declare to be their chosen regime, and what countries actually 
do with respect to exchange rate management. Moreover, the exact nature of deviations seems 
to follow secular trends. In the early 1970s, countries that managed their exchange rate less than 
what could be expected given their announcement dominated the picture, but their share has 
decreased over time. Over the same period, the frequency of observing a country intervening 
more than announced has been increasing, in particular in the 1990s and 2000s, a trend that has 
recently attracted substantial attention from policymakers and academics (see, for example, 
Barajas, Erickson, and Steiner, 2007). Only the proportion of consistent regimes has remained 
roughly constant.  
The finding that countries often do not follow their exchange rate regime announcement has 
important implications for research and policy. Most importantly, studies on the relationship 
between exchange rate policies and economic development (Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, and 
Rogoff, 2006) 4, financial stability (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2003), or the emergence of inflation 
targeting as a preferred monetary policy regime for emerging markets (Goldstein, 2002) will 
remain incomplete without an understanding of regime discrepancies. It is therefore not 
surprising that recent years saw the emergence of a whole body of literature reviewing the 
proper definition, nature and implication of de jure and de facto exchange rate regime choices, 
including the seminal contributions by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003a, b, 2005).  
We know that discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate policies are 
common, but we have a poor understanding of the underlying reasons. Most importantly, and 
contrary to some statements in related contributions, the literature on the fear of floating 
phenomenon initiated by Calvo and Reinhard (2002) does not provide an answer to the 
question: If countries indeed have good reasons to manage their exchange rate actively, why 
                                                 
4 Genberg and Swoboda (2005) show that both announcement and actual exchange rate policy matter for the 
economic performance of a country.  
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would they not announce a regime consistent with optimal policies? Put differently, while the 
literature offers several theoretical explanations why countries dislike exchange rate fluctuations5 
and why countries may be forced to abandon fixed exchange rate regimes6, we know little about 
systematic and potentially voluntary deviations between announced and actual exchange rate 
policies. 
Related Literature 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only four contributions that address this question more 
or less directly. Carmignani, Colombo, and Tirelli (2006) study the role of political factors in 
explaining regime choices more broadly, also touching upon the issue of broken promises. 
The authors argue that, in general, countries attempt to choose de facto and de jure regimes 
consistently, except for those cases in which political incentives lead to some form of cheating or 
dynamic inconsistency. While the authors do not attempt to provide an immediate theoretical 
interpretation for their findings, an implicit assumption of the study seems to be that the 
stronger the incentive to peg or float the stronger the incentive to do so consistently, and that 
deviations from this policy either mirror politically motivated or wrong decision-making. 
Von Hagen and Zhou (2006) view regime gaps as part of an error-correction mechanism that 
allows governments to adjust their actual policies in case the de jure regime has been chosen 
sub-optimally. Such a view, however, does not explain why de jure regimes are chosen sub-
optimally in the first place. This is particularly troublesome since many of the (significant) 
explanatory variables used in their regression analysis do not change much over time, implying 
that they could have been taken into account by policymakers ex ante. Similarly, a dynamic 
error-correction mechanism should allow for the possibility of adapting the de jure regime to 
changing circumstances or policy misjudgments. Such a mechanism, however, cannot be 
identified in the data, since regime discrepancies display substantial persistence. 
Alesina and Wagner (2006) analyze the relationship between regime discrepancies and the quality 
of institutions. They find that countries with low institutional quality tend to announce pegs, but 
are unable to sustain them. At the same time, countries with high institutional quality tend to 
                                                 
5 See, in particular, the literature on fear of floating started by the seminal contribution of Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002). 
6 See the literature on currency crises, e.g. Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1996). 
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either consistently float or to actively manage the exchange rate without announcing it. Alesina 
and Wagner (2006) interpret this behavior as indication of a signaling game, in which countries 
with relatively good institutions try to distinguish themselves from countries with low 
institutional quality. 
While signaling might indeed play an important role in explaining regime discrepancies, the 
evidence provided to support this view suffers from two major shortcomings. First, proxies for 
institutional quality display very little variation over time. Consequently, the quality of 
institutions cannot explain trends in the data. Second, Alesina and Wagner do not explain why 
countries with low-quality institutions announce a peg in this signaling setting. This, in turn, also 
calls into question the validity of the signaling strategy more generally, since policymakers 
confronted with low-quality institutions have a clear incentive to imitate their counterparts, given 
that the expected reputation gain of an announced but not consistently implemented peg is likely 
to be small. Consequently, a crucial question becomes how markets and the public actually react 
to attempts of signaling by inconsistency. 
Starting from this last observation, Barajas et al. (2007) study the reaction of emerging market 
bond spreads to de jure and de facto exchange rate regime choices. They test the hypothesis that 
countries classified towards a flexible exchange rate regime are rewarded with lower spreads. As 
to the potential reasons for fearing to declare a more interventionist regime, the authors argue 
that markets might have a subjective bias against officially fixed exchange rate regimes. This bias 
could be either due to the fact that fixed exchange rates have received much of the blame for the 
emerging market crises in the 1990s, or be the result of the perceived advantage of operating an 
inflation targeting regime. Their main finding is that contrary to the working hypothesis both the 
announcement of a more heavily managed regime and the actual intensity of intervention lower 
spreads significantly. This leaves the puzzle why countries are reluctant to declare that they are 
intervening given that international capital markets do not reward neither de facto nor de jure 
floaters. 
Aim and outline of the study 
While none of the mentioned contributions offers a clear-cut theoretical explanation for the 
observed discrepancies, they all start from certain implicit presumptions about the underlying 
phenomenon. Implicit in the analysis is either the view that deviations between announced and 
implemented policies are the result of sub-optimal policies, or the reflection of some underlying 
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political or institutional reality, or a subjective bias in market perceptions. Apart from Alesina 
and Wagner (2006), existing contributions usually assume that inconsistencies to one side or the 
other can be analyzed separately. Also, issues of policy communication are treated very lightly, in 
spite of the fact that inflation targeting (a communication framework) is sometimes suspected to 
underpin more recent trends in the data. Finally, trends over time are usually not studied but 
taken for granted, in that the fear of floating phenomenon represents the motivation for the 
inquiry.   
The aim of this study is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies. First and foremost, 
we believe that the existing knowledge of time-series and cross-sectional patterns of regime 
discrepancies is highly incomplete. Before testing specific hypotheses about the reasons for and 
the consequences of different arrangements, it is therefore essential to first identify empirical 
regularities that could form the basis of establishing a set of robust stylized facts. To this end, we 
extend the existing de jure regime classification for 2000 - 2004 and pay particular attention to 
regional patterns and clustering, methodological issues in defining regimes, as well as country 
characteristics. 
While our main interest lies in establishing a series of patterns without starting from restrictive 
presumptions, it is obviously impossible to operate in a theory vacuum: As indicated in the title 
of the paper, our working hypothesis is that observed regime discrepancies are systematic, i.e. not 
the result of random policy errors. In fact, one of our main objectives is to provide evidence for 
the existence of systematic elements in observed regime discrepancies, by linking them to 
specific country characteristics. Put differently, we intend to show that there indeed are country 
characteristics that systematically lead decision-makers to favor one type of deviation from 
consistency. For the case of regime discrepancies, this either means that there are (perceived) 
benefits from not declaring that a certain intervention strategy is being followed, or from 
declaring a policy that will not be always followed. 
In providing evidence for systemic discrepancies between declarations and implementation, we 
highlight the importance of regime announcements as elements of a more comprehensive 
communication framework for monetary and exchange rate policies. At first glance, the idea that 
inconsistencies between announcements and policies could serve a purpose seems difficult to 
maintain, as markets and the public would either anticipate ex ante or punish ex post deviations 
from announcements. This, however, is not necessarily the case if one takes into account the 
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potentially constructive role of ambiguity. As pointed out in Best (2005), a work closely related 
to ours, ambiguity can serve a purpose by keeping policy regimes flexible enough to adapt to 
changing economic and political circumstances as well as to re-equilibrate conflicting interests.  
Our main empirical finding is that countries tend to communicate exchange rate regimes at the 
corners of the flexibility spectrum, i.e. either fixed or flexible regimes, but to operate 
intermediate regimes. Whether countries announce a fixed or a freely floating exchange rate 
regime depends on country characteristics, in particular related to trade structure, financial 
development, and financial openness. Countries at different stages of economic and financial 
development differ in the nature of regime discrepancies. Finally, the decreasing frequency of 
countries managing their exchange rate less than announced and the increasing occurrence of 
countries intervening more than announced align with broader economic trends and 
developments worldwide.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data; section III analyzes 
time trends and joint factors of regime discrepancies. In section IV a descriptive statistical 
analysis of deviations of de facto from announced exchange rate regimes is presented. Section V 
contains the econometric analysis and an interpretation of the findings. The last section 
concludes and gives an outlook on future research. 
II.   DATA 
Our sample covers 133 countries from 1973 to 2004. The countries are classified as high, upper 
middle, lower middle, or low income countries according to the classification provided by the 
World Bank for 2004. Table A1 in the appendix lists the countries included in the sample. 
Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies 
Our analysis focuses on the announcement and actual implementation of exchange rate policy. 
Until 1999, the announcement strategy is measured by the de jure exchange rate regimes as 
categorized by Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) based on the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) data. The AREAER contains the intended 
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exchange rate policies that member countries reported to the IMF on an annual basis7. To cover 
more recent trends, we extended the de jure regime classification for the years 2000-2004, 
allowing us to employ a new and unique dataset. To update regime announcements, we start 
with information from AREAER, which since 1998 does not report de jure classifications 
anymore, but contains additional verbal information that often allows identification of a 
countrys stated regime choice. We combine this information with other sources, such as IMF 
staff reports and central banks reports, to complete and cross-check our data. Due to data 
limitations and consistency concerns, we only distinguish between fixed, intermediate, and 
flexible exchange rate regimes, consolidating the more detailed classification of Ghosh et al. 
(2002) into these three groups.8
We capture the actual intervention strategy through the de facto exchange rate regime classification 
(natural classification) developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). One of the key 
characteristics of this classification method is the use of data on parallel and dual exchange rate 
markets9. These market-determined exchange rates are often a better measure of actual and 
expected future monetary policy. In addition, they usually capture the economic impact of 
exchange rate changes more directly than official exchange rates, and do thus display a closer 
relationship to other variables of interest. To identify exchange rate regimes, Reinhart and 
Rogoff separate observations with unified exchange markets from those with parallel or dual 
markets. The de facto classification of the former is then obtained by statistical verification of 
regime announcements or (in cases without announcement) by direct statistical interference, 
which is also used for country-year observations with dual or parallel markets. The statistical 
evaluation measures de facto exchange rate behavior via the mean absolute monthly change in 
the market-determined (official or parallel) nominal exchange rate, based on a five-year moving 
window. 
                                                 
7 In most of the years covered by our sample, countries were required to assign themselves to one of four categories 
(fixed, limited flexibility, managed floating, and independently floating). For an exposition of the IMF classification 
and changes over time, see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) extended these groups 
to fifteen buckets, see table A2. 
8 The exact mapping is shown in table A2. Our coarse classification corresponds to the one used by Ghosh, Gulde, 
and Wolf (2002) with the exception of the secret basket pegs which we include into the intermediate category 
instead of the fixed one. We explain the reasons in the appendix (table A2). 
9 Dual markets are typically legal while parallel markets may or may not be legal (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)). 
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 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) use fourteen buckets for their regime classification. However, as the 
categorizations of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes are not congruent, we regroup 
them into three broad categories: fixed, intermediate, and floating regimes; the precise mapping 
is presented in table A210. The Reinhart and Rogoff dataset11 covers 153 countries for the period 
1946-2001. For the years 2002-2004 we use the update of the natural classification provided 
by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006).12  
Compared to other de facto classifications (e.g. the widely used dataset by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 200513, the IMF de facto classification used in Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2002, or 
the recent compilation by Klein and Shambaugh, 200614) the Reinhart and Rogoff dataset has 
the advantage of offering the most extensive country and time coverage15. Moreover, we see at 
least two methodological reasons to prefer the Reinhart and Rogoff classification. First, the use 
of market-determined exchange rates seems to provide a much better picture of the underlying 
economic policies than official rates do (all other de facto classifications rely on official exchange 
rates). Reinhart and Rogoff point out that parallel markets are frequently used as back door 
floating, in most cases with simultaneous exchange controls. In these situations, the use of 
official rates would strongly bias the results towards observing consistency between de jure and 
de facto fixed regimes. Second, Reinhart and Rogoff take the perspective of larger and more 
continuous regimes by using a five-year moving window, making it less likely to wrongly identify 
a one-time devaluation or shock as a regime change. 
                                                 
10 Our three groups correspond to the coarse classification provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) when categories 
2 and 3 are subsumed as intermediate and 4 and 5 as floating regimes. 
11 Available at http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reinhart/annual1.dta.  
12 This data, available at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/updated_rr_nat_class.pdf, covers the years 
1990-2004. If observations not classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) during that period were classified by 
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) we use the improved data. 
13 Available at http://200.32.4.58/~ely/Base_2005.zip. 
14 Klein and Shambaughs (2006) classification distinguishes only between fixed and floating exchange rates which 
we consider insufficient as intermediate regimes are quantitatively important and different in nature from fixed and 
floating regimes, as will be discussed later on. 
15 The IMF de facto classification is available only since 1990. The Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
classification suffers from a substantial number of unclassified observations due to a lack of data, especially on 
international reserves. See Frankel and Wei (2007) for a discussion of different de facto classifications and a novel 
proposal for a synthesis of techniques to determine the de facto exchange rate regime of countries. 
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A drawback of the Reinhart and Rogoff approach is that only the unconditional volatility of the 
nominal exchange rate is used, so measures of intervention intensity such as international reserve 
and interest rate changes are not taken into account. Thus, no clear distinction can be made 
between exchange rate stability arising from active policies or from the absence of shocks, 
leading to a potential overestimation of de facto fixed exchange rate regimes. Although Reinhart 
and Rogoff provide evidence that potential biases are limited, the possibility should be kept in 
mind. Nonetheless, we consider the RR classification the one most suitable to the questions we 
post. To check robustness, we test the sensitivity of our results against Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzeneggers (2005) classification, which includes the volatility of international reserves, but 
does not take into account interest rate policy.  
Figure 1: Taxonomy of de jure and de facto exchange rate regime combinations 
Communication 
Framework 
 
Intervention 
strategy 
De jure 
Fixed De jure Intermediate 
De jure 
Flexible 
De facto 
Fixed C IMA IMA 
De facto 
Intermediate ILA C IMA 
De facto 
Flexible ILA ILA C 
 
With respect to the concrete alternatives policymakers are facing, it is useful to start with a 
taxonomy of de jure and de facto regime combinations (figure 1). Our aim is to find empirical 
regularities related to a countrys choice to locate either to the northeast (with a strategy 
combination in which policymakers intervene more than announced, or IMA) or to the 
southwest (with a strategy combination in which policymakers intervene less than announced, or 
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ILA) of the main diagonal (consistency between de jure and de facto, or C).16 Obviously, 
conscious choice will never explain fully the observed combination of the jure and de facto 
regimes, since policymakers will usually not take into account all the possible future states of the 
world. In fact, the de jure exchange rate regime is an ex-ante stated policy intention while the de 
facto regime resembles the ex-post actual policy decisions. However, we intend to show that 
there indeed are country characteristics that systematically lead decision-makers to favor one 
type of deviation from consistency. 
Explanatory variables 
We use a wide set of macroeconomic, structural, institutional, and financial indicators to identify 
those characteristics that are associated with regime discrepancies of a specific kind.17 The 
complete dataset is described in Table A3 in the appendix. Our choice of variables is mainly 
guided by previous studies on the determinants of exchange rate regimes, as we expect that 
many of the variables relevant for the choice of de jure and de facto regimes separately will also 
explain part of the variation in regime discrepancies. Underlying this expectation is our view that 
regime discrepancies are a reflection of conflicting views and agendas on exchange rate policies 
that give ambiguity a potentially constructive role. 
Starting with trade-related variables, we measure the degree of openness as the sum of exports 
and imports relative to GDP. The importance of primary commodity exports is proxied by the 
sum of agricultural raw materials, ores, metals and fuel exports as a share of all merchandise 
exports while trade concentration is measured as the share of total exports to the three largest 
trading partners. Furthermore, we include the three year centered standard deviation of the 
terms of trade growth rate to measure the volatility of an economys external environment. 
                                                 
16 We consider the labels fear of floating and fear of pegging used by other authors inappropriate in the present 
context. Consider fear of floating as introduced by Calvo and Reinhart (2002): it describes the desire of a country 
to limit exchange rate fluctuations but it does not embrace why countries do not announce their actual intervention 
strategy. Fear of pegging has been used by Alesina and Wagner (2006) and by von Hagen and Zhou (2006) to 
describe a situation where the de jure exchange rate regime is more rigid than the de facto one (what we label ILA). 
However, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) have used the term to describe situations in which a country having 
a (de facto) fixed exchange rate regime is unwilling to explicitly announce it (fear of floating in a narrow sense). 
17 The macroeconomic data is mainly taken from the International Financial Statistics and the World Economic 
Outlook as well as from the World Development Indicators. An important subset of explanatory variables is related 
to financial development and financial openness. 
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The degree of financial market development seems to influence the choice of exchange rate 
policies (see e.g. Husain, Mody, and Rogoff, 2005). Stages of development are captured by two 
different types of country classifications: the World Bank concept of income groups and the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI) concept of emerging markets and developed 
economies. We consider the income categories of the World Bank (low, lower middle, upper 
middle, and high income) based on GNI per capita (in USD) the most suitable indicator of 
economic development. The low and middle income countries are often referred to as 
developing countries. The MSCI distinguishes between developing, emerging market, and 
developed economies. The separating feature of emerging market economies (EMEs) from 
other developing countries is the level of market capitalization. The MSCI differentiates between 
EMEs and advanced economies using a combination of macroeconomic and financial 
indicators, such as GDP per capita, the extent and quality of financial regulation and restrictions 
and perceived investment and/or country risk. Thus, starting from a threshold level of financial 
market development, the separating line between the country groups is drawn based on financial 
sector and institutional strength.  We mainly use the World Bank groups for our analysis while 
controlling for the robustness of our findings with respect to the alternative MSCI 
categorization. Additionally, we use a time-varying MSCI dummy as explanatory variable, which 
is equal to 1 from the year of inclusion of a country in the MSCI onwards and 0 otherwise. 
Two alternative measures of financial openness are used to account for the distinction between 
de facto and de jure policies.18 The degree of financial openness and the actual integration into 
international financial markets are very likely to affect a countrys choice of an exchange rate 
regime and of how to communicate this choice. When capital markets are open and financial 
integration is high, the potential for market discipline increases. If capital controls are in place 
(or the capital account is open but no capital actually flows across borders), these possibilities are 
limited or absent and policymakers have additional leverage on domestic monetary policy. As de 
jure measure, we use the indicator of financial openness constructed by Chinn and Ito (2006)19 
which is based on the intensity of capital controls (official restrictions on capital account 
transactions) as reported in the AREAER. To capture the degree of actual financial integration, 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of how to measure financial openness and financial integration, see e.g. Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, 
and Wei (2006). 
19 Available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/kaopen_2005.xls. 
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we follow Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2006) and construct an additional measure based on 
the sum of external assets and liabilities over GDP, using the data provided by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006)20. 
In addition to variables related to trade and financial structure and openness, we assess the role 
of country size (measured by population or GDP) and the level of economic development 
(GDP per capita). In some of the regressions in section V, year dummies are included. We also 
look at regional dummies to account for the geographic clustering we found in our statistical 
analysis.  
III.   TIME TRENDS AND JOINT FACTORS 
As already pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks, and 
Oomes (2003) the type of discrepancy between announced and de facto policy has been subject 
to an important shift over time, from labeling something as a peg when it is not, to labeling 
something as floating when the degree of exchange rate flexibility has in fact been very limited 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, p.37). However, neither of the two publications has pursued this 
aspect further, so it is worthwhile to lay out some important patterns we find in the data. Over 
the whole sample period (1973-2004) only 60 per cent of the total observations21 involve 
consistent regimes while 22 per cent are associated with ILA and 18 per cent with IMA. 
However, as can be seen from graph 1 the occurrence of ILA has been decreasing over time, 
from 28 per cent in the 1970s to 10 per cent in the 2000s, while the frequency of observing IMA 
has been increasing, from 10 per cent in the 1970s to 27 per cent in the 2000s. The proportion 
of consistent regimes has remained roughly constant.   
                                                 
20 The data is available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip.  
21 With observation we mean a country-year data point. 
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Graph 1: Exchange rate regime discrepancies, 1973-2004 
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It is instructive to look at the de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes accompanying observed 
discrepancies. Not surprisingly, the higher the proportion of de jure fixed or floating regimes, 
the higher is the potential for ILA and IMA, respectively. For the whole sample, 47 per cent of 
the total observations were de jure fixed, 33 per cent intermediate and 20 per cent floating 
exchange rate regimes22 (graph 2). However, the distribution of de facto exchange rate regimes 
differs substantially; only 36 per cent of all the observations were associated with fixed exchange 
rate regimes (11 percentage points less than de jure), 49 per cent intermediate (16 percentage 
points more) and 15 per cent floating regimes, which can be separated into 10 per cent of freely 
falling and, thus, only 5 per cent truly freely floating regimes. Note that it is important to 
separate out the freely falling category23, characterized by (very) high inflation rates which lead to 
important distortions (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).  
                                                 
22 The overall picture is unchanged if we look only at the years 1973-1999 for which the de jure regimes were 
published in the AREAER. If we include the secret basket pegs into the fixed category (this information is available 
only until 1999), 56 per cent of all observations are de jure fixed and only 27 per cent intermediate. For a discussion 
of the categorization of secret basket pegs see appendix. 
23 The freely falling category encompasses observations when the twelve-month inflation rate is equal to or exceeds 
40 per cent per annum and, additionally, includes the first six months following an exchange rate crisis if it marked a 
transition from a peg or quasi-peg to a managed or independent float. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, p.3-4) 
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Graph 2: Exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004 
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As graph A1a illustrates, de jure regimes have exhibited a clear trend from fixed towards flexible 
regimes: fixed regimes declined from 66 per cent in the 1970s to 42 per cent in the 2000s, while 
floating regimes increased from 7 per cent in the 1970s to 33 per cent in 2000s. In contrast, the 
distribution of the de facto exchange rate regimes has remained more stable (graph A1b). Fixed 
regimes decreased from 44 per cent in the 1970s to 31 per cent in the 1980s and increased to 40 
per cent in the 2000s. The floating regimes increased from 8 per cent in the 1970s to 13 per cent 
in the 2000s while intermediate exchange rate regimes remained at 40 to 50 per cent of all 
observations.24
Another interesting feature is that discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate 
policies are highly persistent over time, as documented by von Hagen and Zhou (2006). 
Discrepancies are not single observations that occur from time to time but they seem to follow 
systematic pattern. Some countries display ILA or IMA over nearly the whole sample period, 
while others moved from ILA to IMA following the overall trend, sometimes transitioning 
through consistent combinations. Most of the countries sticking to one type of discrepancies 
have changed their de facto and/or de jure policies quite frequently.  
The transition from announcing more rigid regimes than de facto followed towards announcing 
more flexible regimes has been accompanied by increased financial liberalization and financial 
                                                 
24 Additionally, we observe important differences in regime choices between country groups, specifically between 
high, upper middle, lower middle, and low income countries.  For a graphical analysis on de facto and de jure 
exchange rates regimes as well as resulting discrepancies, see graphs A1-A5 and table A4 in the appendix. 
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integration (see graph A6). While the years around the transition from ILA towards IMA were 
characterized by particularly high world inflation rates, they have decreased to extraordinary low 
levels afterwards. 
IV.   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Consistent regime combinations 
Before analyzing discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate regimes it is 
useful to point out some stylized facts and country characteristics which may induce 
policymakers to explicitly choose consistent regime combinations. A first observation is that the 
overwhelming part of consistent regimes are fixed (50 per cent), closely followed by intermediate 
exchange rate regimes (39 per cent) while only 11 per cent of the observations are related to 
floating regimes. 
One reason for this observation is that extreme forms of fixed regimes (monetary unions, 
dollarization, and currency boards) are chosen to signal the impossibility of deviation from the 
announced regime. Failures to follow the announcements are immediately visible and the cost of 
exit is extremely high25. Indeed, these regimes represent a significant share of consistent 
observations26. Extreme forms of fixed regimes are mostly chosen by very small and open 
economies, such as the members of the CFA French franc zone27 and the Eastern Caribbean 
Dollar zone28, but also include advanced economies in the EMU or by countries with a long 
history of high inflation and crises (such as Argentina and Ecuador). 
Among the consistent free floaters, one can distinguish two main country groups. The first 
group consists of countries that have experienced crises and high inflation rates over the 
                                                 
25 The exit of Argentina from its currency board arrangement in 2001/2002 started a new discussion about the 
transparency and disciplining capacity of this exchange rate arrangement. 
26 The share is 29 per cent of the consistent regime combinations until 1999; afterwards we do not have detailed 
information. 
27 CFA franc zone countries included in the sample are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo (WAEMU), and Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
(CAEMC). 
28 The countries in the Eastern Caribbean currency union (ECCU is a currency board arrangement) included in the 
sample are: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & Grenadines. 
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majority of years in the sample. These countries usually are characterized as freely falling within 
the de facto classification, sometimes showing short and infrequent events to stabilize 
expectations through exchange-rate based stabilization programs. The second group consists of 
highly developed countries like Australia, Japan, and the United States.  
Intervening Less Than Announced (ILA) 
Over the whole sample the number of ILA observations is surprisingly high. Although the 
occurrence of ILA clearly declined over time, still 14 per cent of all observations are related to 
ILA in the 1990s and 2000s. How can this widespread phenomenon be explained? The 
announcement of a rigid exchange rate regime is a means to import credibility for tough 
monetary policy from the anchor country. Then, pursuing a more flexible exchange rate policy, 
e.g. through frequent parity adjustments, should result in a loss of credibility. As a consequence, 
any new attempt to build up credibility via a rigid exchange rate regime will most likely prove 
even harder. Consequently, the existing literature would not consider ILA to be the result of 
actual policy choices. Instead, it would be considered a crisis phenomenon resulting from the 
actual inability of a country to pursue the rigid policy (inability to peg).29
Before taking a closer look at the economic characteristics of the countries that have a history of 
ILA, it is useful to point out two aspects of the data that in our view have not received enough 
attention in related contributions. When studying the countries identified as those operating 
under ILA, we were surprised about the sensitivity of the results with respect to (i.) the 
classification of some of the more rare or exotic exchange rate regimes, specifically secret basket 
pegs, and (ii.) the choice of reference currencies for cooperative systems. Not accounting for this 
sensitivity leads to potentially severe measurement errors and implies an often counter-intuitive 
classification with respect to the regime discrepancy. A more detailed discussion is provided in 
the appendix (table A2). 
Turning to the characterization of countries that are mainly associated with ILA, exploring our 
data allowed us to identify a number of interesting empirical regularities. Most importantly, it is 
apparent from our data that ILA is not just a crisis phenomenon or a mere inability to peg. 
                                                 
29 This is also the perspective taken in Alesina and Wagner (2006). 
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While the de jure exchange rate regimes predominately related to ILA are fixed regimes30 (77 per 
cent), the dominating intervention strategies are de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes 
with 64 per cent of all ILA observations31. Only 33 per cent of all ILA observations were 
characterized as de facto freely falling. Since the latter can be interpreted as a proxy for crises 
episodes and, more generally, for the inability to implement restrictive monetary policies, crises 
and high inflation episodes account for an important, but limited proportion of ILA 
observations.32 The view that ILA represents an inability to stick to the announced rigid 
exchange rate regime is thus only partially supported. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that 
such failures only result in ILA if policymakers do not change their announced exchange rate 
regime during the crisis. One reason for such a behavior may be some form of announcement 
inertia, e.g. due to the time-consuming political process necessary to change the legal 
framework.33
An important corollary to this observation is that de facto intermediate regimes are 
overrepresented in the ILA group, as intermediate exchange rate regimes constitute only 
half of the de facto regime observations. Although intermediate exchange rate regimes account 
for a significant proportion of intervention strategy choices, there seems to be a preference of 
not communicating such choice, and rather operate against the benchmark of an announced peg 
(or announced float, as argued below). Only half of all de facto intermediate exchange rate 
regime observations are actually announced, and countries choose instead a strategy of more 
                                                 
30 More precisely, from 1973 to 1999 (due to data restrictions) ILA observations are predominantly associated with 
single currency pegs (43 per cent) and basket pegs (33 per cent). 
31 These are predominantly de facto crawling bands (35 per cent) and managed floating (21 per cent). 
32 28 per cent of all ILA observations are indeed preceded or accompanied by a currency crisis and this proportion 
is higher than for IMA and consistent observations, 21 and 17 per cent, respectively. Note that these figures refer to 
1975-1997 only due to data availability. 
33 As the de jure regime is reported only once a year (ex-ante) to the IMF, it is sufficient that policymakers are 
unable to follow their announced policy to generate a single ILA observation. Also, an announced change in the 
exchange rate regime may not be reflected in the official de jure classification when it occurs over the year. 
However, if at least two consecutive years of ILA are observed, other forces have to be in place, e.g. some form of 
announcement inertia. Note that only 22 ILA observations (out of 812) are neither preceded nor followed by an 
ILA observation (or missing observations). 
 
 17
intervention (a fixed exchange rate regime)  in 28 per cent of the cases, resulting in ILA, or of no 
intervention (a floating regime), resulting in IMA.34  
A closer look at the countries predominately characterized by ILA (see table A4a) reveals some 
further interesting patterns. First, with respect to geographic distribution, low and middle 
income countries in the Middle East and North Africa show a particularly strong tendency of 
following less rigid exchange rate policies than announced. The high proportion of observations 
involving ILA in this country group is mirrored in the dominance of ILA in OPEC countries. 
Controlling for the higher prevalence of de jure fixed regimes (see the final column in table A4a) 
does not qualitatively alter these results. 
The high incidence of ILA among Middle Eastern & North African as well as OPEC countries 
raises the question of whether there could be a potential link between the share of primary 
exports (in particular fuel export) and the occurrence of ILA. While we do not want to jump to a 
conclusion prematurely, it is interesting to note that primary exports (in per cent of all 
merchandise exports) belong to the group of variables for which the data shows a significant 
difference in group means, medians, and distribution considering all observations. However, fuel 
exports (as share of all merchandise exports) show significantly different means, medians, and 
distribution only for ILA observations related to de jure fixed regimes (see table A5, lower 
table). Moreover, countries with a large share of mineral exports seem to follow ILA policies in 
most world regions. For example, a significant share of the ILA observations in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (approximately 25%) is related to the cases of Botswana (with its dominant diamond 
industry) and Zambia (long dominated by copper). Similarly, most large mineral exporters in 
South America (excluding Chile) have at least one substantial data spell characterized by ILA35. 
Finally, Norway is among the few European countries that show a substantial ILA spell, 
together with its Scandinavian neighbors36.   
                                                 
34 However, if an intermediate exchange rate regime is announced, the likelihood of actually observing it is relatively 
high: 70 per cent of the announced intermediate regimes are consistent and, therewith, it is the exchange rate 
category with the highest proportion of consistent regimes. 
35 In particular, Bolivia, Peru, and Suriname have substantial ILA observations (13, 13, and 12 years, respectively) 
and mineral exports are at least 30 per cent of all merchandise exports. 
36 Norway and Sweden had ILA from 1978 until 1991, Finland from 1977 until 1991, and Iceland 1973-1975, 1977-
1983 and 1993-1999. 
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We performed parametric and non-parametric tests for the equality of means, medians, and 
distributions for several economic characteristics of countries that have ILA observations against 
consistent and IMA observations. As the assumption of a normal distribution of economic 
variables seems strong, the comparison of medians and distributions may provide a more 
meaningful picture of average performance in the two groups than the comparison of means. 
However, for robustness, we provide all three. The results, reported in table A5, suggest that 
variables related to inflation, trade openness, and financial openness as well as to institutional 
quality do differ between the groups operating under ILA and non-ILA regime combinations, in 
addition to the export structure described above. The inflation rates for ILA observations are 
significantly higher while trade openness and the import share are significantly lower. Financial 
openness, both de jure and de facto, and institutional quality (across different measures) are 
significantly higher for non-ILA observations. Measures of economic development (GDP per 
capita, in USD and PPP corrected) and economic size (GDP and population), however, show 
only a weak relationship with ILA observations.37  
Intervening More Than Announced (IMA) 
Over the whole sample period from 1973 until 2004 we observe IMA in only 18 per cent of the 
total observations. However, while ILA has been decreasing, the frequency of observing IMA 
has been increasing over time. The literature on fear of floating started by the seminal work of 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) provides numerous explanations for the reluctance of countries to 
tolerate substantial fluctuations in the exchange rate. The most prominent reasons are significant 
balance-sheet effects, mostly due to high liability dollarization, and high pass-through from 
exchange rates to prices.38 Nevertheless, this literature does not offer a comprehensive 
justification for countries choices to announce a more flexible exchange rate regime. If there are 
no credibility gains through the announcement of a rigid exchange rate regime39, policymaker 
may refrain from exchange rate commitments altogether and, thus, retain full flexibility.  
                                                 
37 The numbers are not very sensitive to the inclusion of the years 2000-2004.  
38 Rationales for fear of floating are provided, e.g., by Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2001), Lahiri and Vegh 
(2001), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001). 
39 As exposed by, e.g., Rogoff et al. (2003) only countries at a low level of financial development seem able to gain 
low inflation credibility through the announcement of rigid exchange rate regimes. 
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Analyzing under which circumstances countries predominantly exhibit IMA reveals some 
interesting patterns. Remarkably, the relative frequency of observing IMA differs between 
country groups at different stages of economic and financial development (table A4b), and there 
has been an important shift over time (see discussion above). Over the whole sample period, 
advanced economies have the highest frequency of IMA (34 per cent of the observations in the 
country group) followed by EMEs with 21 per cent. Developing countries only choose IMA in 
11 per cent of all cases. However, while until the beginning of the 1990s IMA is nearly an 
exclusive phenomenon of advanced economies, IMA is rapidly gaining importance in EMEs.40 
Especially lower middle income countries display a high and increasing share of IMA 
observations41. Additionally, IMA observations are clearly dominated by de facto intermediate 
exchange rate regimes, which account for 66 per cent of the total IMA observations, with little 
time variation42. Thus, de facto intermediate regimes are overrepresented in the IMA 
observations as they are in the ILA ones43. With respect to announcement choices, floating 
regimes dominate accordingly (72 per cent).  
These figures suggest that IMA is in important ways related to the choice of intermediate 
intervention strategies. Furthermore, the level of economic and financial development to which 
the difference between country groups can ultimately be pinned down seems to matter. It is 
interesting to note, however, that IMA is more widespread amongst lower middle than upper 
middle income countries. Among the countries showing considerable IMA spells we can 
additionally identify the following two groups. (i) EMU members prior to the adoption of the 
euro in 1999, and (ii) advanced economies which have well developed financial markets and are 
very open (economically and financially): Switzerland, Canada, and New Zealand. The 
                                                 
40 This change comes along with the adoption of Inflation Targeting frameworks in EMEs which involve the 
announcement of a free float. Due to the particular economic and financial situation in many EMEs, however, they 
are reluctant to tolerate excessive exchange rate volatility, thus exhibiting fear of floating and mostly also IMA. 
This is the subject of another paper by one of the authors (Julia Bersch). The apparently reverting trend in 1999 is 
entirely due to the EU member countries adopting the euro which through a very strict implementation of the rule-
based de jure regime to fulfill the Maastricht criteria have exhibited IMA. 
41 Approximately half of the emerging market economies are lower middle and the other half upper middle income 
countries. 
42 Among the de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes, crawling bands dominate with 30 per cent of all IMA 
observations closely followed by managed floats (26 per cent). 
43 Intermediate exchange rate regimes constitute only half of all de facto regime observations in the sample. 
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considerable increase of IMA as regime choice in recent years, in particular for EMEs, suggests 
that worldwide economic trends such as capital account liberalizations, increasing capital flows, 
and declining inflations rate may be of importance for its explanation (see section III). 
For a better understanding of the key macroeconomic variables related to IMA, we look  again at 
differences in means, medians, and distributions of central economic and financial variables 
between the countries operating under IMA and those with consistent or ILA regimes. The 
results are reported in table A6. For IMA observations, inflation rates are significantly lower44, 
institutional quality and financial openness significantly higher. The differences in other variables 
are not significant across specifications. Furthermore, conditional on having announced a 
flexible exchange rate regime, countries with IMA have a significantly higher degree of trade 
openness and of trade concentration. For the whole sample, the degree of trade concentration 
and imports to GDP ratios are lower for IMA observations. Overall, countries operating under 
IMA have lower primary exports, are richer, and economically more developed while 
conditioning on de jure flexible regimes does not deliver significant differences. 
V.   ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
To give a more accurate picture of the potential links between country characteristics and regime 
discrepancies, we regress indicators of regime discrepancies on a broad set of variables using a 
pooled probit approach. After briefly discussing methodology and explanatory variables, we 
outline the main results of our empirical exercise. We then discuss the robustness of our results 
and provide an interpretation of the results. 
Methodological Considerations 
Our main interest lies in explaining the choice variable y*, defined as the desired combination of 
communication and intervention strategy. We see y* as a latent variable that depends on a vector 
of explanatory variables x 
y* = G(x �) + u 
                                                 
44 The large difference of average inflation rates conditional on having announced a flexible regime is due to the 
freely falling observations in the non-IMA groups. 
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where u is an error term independent of x with mean zero. Instead of the unobserved y*, we 
have data on the combination y of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. If the announced 
exchange rate regime is more rigid than the de facto regime, y equals -1 (ILA), if the two regimes 
are of the same degree of flexibility, y equals 0 (consistent), and if the announced regime is more 
flexible than the de facto one, y equals 1 (IMA).  
Given this characterization, one way to proceed would be to use a multinomial response model. 
Instead we opt for a binary approach, merging consistent and IMA (ILA) observations as 
control group when analyzing ILA (IMA), and then using pooled probit estimation techniques. 
One reason not to use a multinomial approach is that this would require assuming independence 
of irrelevant alternatives, a condition that is unlikely to hold in the present case. Similarly, there 
is no natural ordering for the three alternatives, precluding the use of an ordered discrete choice 
model. Finally, by using a binary specification, we make our results comparable to the related 
contribution of Alesina and Wagner (2006), who also compare ILA and IMA separately against 
the remaining observations.45 We do not use fixed effects estimation, since many of our variables 
display no or very little variation over time. Also the use of a random effects estimator appears 
inappropriate, because we have a very large country sample which cannot be considered as 
randomly drawn from the underlying population. Finally, we prefer to follow an explicit binary 
choice model and then test our result against a linear probability model. 
In addition to using the complete dataset, we create sub-samples, assessing the probability that a 
country chooses a certain regime combination conditional on observing certain de facto or de 
jure regimes. For both IMA and ILA, we first code the endogenous variable as 1 if we observe a 
specific discrepancy, and 0 otherwise. However, with this approach we cannot disentangle the 
general incentives to announce a more fixed or more flexible exchange rate regime. Therefore, in 
a second set of regressions, we will restrict our sample to those observations involving de jure 
fixed (in the case of ILA) or flexible (in the case of IMA) regimes, and then look at 
characteristics of countries sticking to their announcement against those that do not. As noted 
above, both types of discrepancies are dominated by intermediate de facto policies combined 
                                                 
45 In contrast to our approach, Alesina and Wagner differentiate between degrees of distance between de facto and 
de jure policies (i.e., conditional on de jure flexible regimes, de facto intermediate regimes are treated differently 
than de facto fixed), by applying an ordered logit approach. 
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with the announcement of corner solutions, e.g. fixed or floating exchange rate regimes. Thus, in 
a last set of regressions we confine our sample to those observations involving de facto 
intermediate regimes and analyze what distinguishes countries with a de jure fixed (floating) 
regime from others. 
As our aim is to identify a set of stylized facts, we use a broad set of potential explanatory 
variables and report best regression results, both in terms of robustness and significance. Starting 
from the observations in section IV above, we focus on the degree of trade openness, the 
importance of primary commodity exports, as well as measures of price stability, financial 
openness, and economic and financial development.  
With respect to price stability, it is worth pointing out that the inflation rate is not only a likely 
determinant of exchange rate regime choices and possible deviations of de facto from 
announced policies but is itself determined by the exchange rate regime46. However, the 
exchange rate policy is likely to have only a lagged effect on the inflation rate. Thus, by using the 
lagged yearly CPI inflation rate, the scope for endogeneity is reduced. Furthermore, the effect of 
the inflation rate on exchange rate regime choices is most likely not linear. Very high inflation 
rates (a commonly used threshold value being 40 per cent p.a.47) will have a different effect than 
moderate rates of price increases. Therefore, we additionally include a (lagged) high inflation 
dummy for observations involving inflation rates of 40 per cent or more on an annual basis. 
Additionally, we include the ratio of imports to GDP to proxy the extent to which domestic 
prices are exogenously determined. 
In our baseline specifications, we do not include measures of institutional quality, mainly because 
of the effect on sample size: Including standard measures of institutional quality data in the 
regressions reduces the sample substantially and systematically, since data is only available for a 
sub-set of countries and since 1984. However, to account for the potential importance of 
institutional quality and the evidence provided by Alesina and Wagner (2006), we run robustness 
checks, the results of which are reported below. 
                                                 
46 See the literature on the macroeconomic effects of different exchange rate regimes, e.g. Ghosh et al. (2002), 
Kuttner and Posen (2001). 
47 High inflation is defined as inflation rates of 40 per cent or more per year following the definition of the World 
Bank, and of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for the freely falling category. 
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As pointed out above, we use two measures of financial openness: a de jure and a de facto 
measure. As with inflation, regime choices may affect financial integration and the incentives to 
change official restrictions on capital account transactions. On the one hand, if a country has a 
floating exchange rate regime, capital restrictions should not play a role. On the other hand, 
goods and capital markets dislike substantial uncertainties with respect to exchange rate 
fluctuations. While financial openness will affect a countrys decisions on exchange rate policies, 
exchange rate policies are likely to affect actual financial integration only with some delay. Still, 
to mitigate potential endogeneity problems when using measures of financial openness as 
explanatory variables, we lag them by one period. 
To account for important differences in the relation between regime choices and country 
characteristics at different stages of economic and financial development, we perform separate 
regressions for each country group.  It is likely that economic and financial structure matter in 
different ways for countries at different stages of financial and/or economic development. For 
example, the stability implications of financial and trade openness will change as domestic 
financial markets develop, additional liquidity, insurance, hedging, and risk diversification 
services are provided, and credit constraints are relaxed. The development of financial markets 
and institutions thus influences an economys ability to deal with and profit from international 
capital flows, and vice versa. A minimum level of financial development seems to be required to 
attract capital flows but countries without deep financial markets may be restricted in their 
capacity to absorb large capital inflows. Furthermore, if a country has important external 
financial positions, it is more sensitive to exchange rate volatility but it may suffer additional 
volatility if the positions are frequently changed due to high capital flows.  
Baseline results 
The results of the pooled probit estimations for ILA and IMA for the whole sample and 
separated by income groups are reported in tables A7 and A8-A11, respectively, in the 
appendix48. In table A11 we provide an overview of the estimation results. A first important 
insight is that the separate treatment of countries at different stages of economic and financial 
development seems to be important. For example, higher terms of trade volatility increases the 
                                                 
48 We use the same regressors for all sets of estimations to avoid additional selection problems due to data 
availability.  
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probability of ILA when a de jure regime is announced but has no significant effect otherwise 
when considering all countries jointly. Analyzing countries at different stages of economic 
development separately (either through subsamples or interaction terms), higher terms of trade 
volatility is associated with a significantly higher probability for ILA and a lower probability for 
IMA for lower middle income countries. For high income countries it reduces the likelihood of 
both IMA and ILA, thus making consistent combinations more likely. 
With respect to other trade-related variables, a higher degree of trade openness reduces the 
probability of IMA, except for high income countries, and increases the probability of ILA for 
low and lower middle income countries while reducing it for upper middle income countries. 
More interestingly, higher exports of primary commodities increase the probability of consistent 
regime combinations (reduces it for both IMA and ILA) for low income countries. For lower 
middle income countries, however, the effect tends towards the opposite: higher primary 
commodity exports increase the probability of ILA. Conditional on a de facto intermediate 
exchange rate regime, upper middle income countries tend also significantly towards ILA. 
In general, high inflation makes ILA more and IMA less likely, supporting the view that crises 
and inability to peg are part of the explanation. However, lower middle income countries having 
de facto intermediate regimes and having experienced high inflation in the previous year tend to 
be more cautious and to announce a flexible exchange rate regime.  
Turning to financial openness, a de jure more open capital account significantly reduces the 
probability of ILA. Furthermore, it tends to increase the probability of IMA for all country 
groups except low income countries. The evidence for de facto financial openness is mixed, with 
the exception of high income countries for which a higher de facto financial openness makes 
IMA significantly more and ILA less likely.  
A listing in the MSCI index (a proxy for the crossing of a critical level of financial market 
development) increases the likelihood of experiencing inconsistent regime combinations, both 
ILA and IMA, for lower middle income countries while reducing it for upper middle income 
countries. Conditional on de facto intermediate regimes, all countries have a higher probability 
of announcing a more flexible exchange rate regime when included in the MSCI. More 
specifically, the inclusion in the MSCI increases the probability of IMA for upper middle income 
countries while increasing the probability of deviations from consistent regimes for lower middle 
income countries. 
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Furthermore, we get the following insights from the regressions conditional on specific 
exchange rate regime announcements made. On the one hand, conditional on de jure fixed 
regimes, higher terms of trade volatility, lower trade openness, and higher de facto financial 
openness reduce the likelihood of ILA for high income countries. However, lower middle 
income countries are more likely to have ILA when included in the MSCI index, when they have 
higher primary commodity exports, and higher terms of trade volatility. The probability of ILA 
is higher for low income countries when they have lower primary commodity exports and high 
inflation in the previous year. On the other hand, conditional on the announcement of a 
flexible exchange rate regime, higher trade openness, lower terms of trade volatility, and 
higher financial openness (both de facto and de jure) make it more likely for high income 
countries to operate under IMA. Upper middle income countries are more likely to have IMA 
when they are not included in the MSCI, are less open to trade, have low inflation, and higher de 
jure financial openness. For lower middle income countries, higher primary commodity exports, 
lower terms of trade volatility, and low inflation are positively related with IMA. Lower trade 
openness and de jure financial openness makes IMA more likely for low income countries. 
Robustness checks  sensitivity analysis 
As to methodological robustness, we have checked all our results with a linear probability model 
and using interaction terms instead of sub-samples and the signs of the coefficients remained 
unchanged. Furthermore, regressions for narrower samples, excluding small countries (with a 
population of less than one million) and considering only a number of economically important 
countries, confirmed our key results. Neither did the exclusion of the observations since 2000 
(for which we construed the de jure exchange rate regimes) qualitatively alter the results. As has 
been previously discussed, freely falling observations may distort our results. However, 
regressions without these observations did not change our results.  
Alesina and Wagners (2006) results suggest that institutional quality is pivotal for explaining 
discrepancies between exchange rate regime announcements and de facto policies. As 
institutional quality data is only available for a sub-set of countries and since 1984, the sample is 
substantially and systematically changed. We, nevertheless, run robustness checks including 
indicators of country risk (composite risk rating), bureaucracy quality, and democratic 
accountability. The main insight is that better institutional quality significantly increases the 
likelihood of IMA while institutional quality has no effect on the probability of ILA across 
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different specifications. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients of variables related to IMA are 
mostly unchanged while primary commodity exports (related to ILA) are not significantly related 
to regime discrepancies anymore. This, however, is not surprising since ILA is predominantly 
observed during the 1970s and 1980s for which institutional quality data is not available and 
which are thus not included.  
The results reported above, however, are not very robust to the use of the de facto exchange 
rate regime classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger. The main reason is that the 
classification differs fundamentally from the one of Reinhart and Rogoff (the correlation is only 
0.5). Therefore, we consider only observations for which the two classifications coincide. This 
reduces the number of observations involving deviations between announcements and de facto 
policies significantly49. However, using only observations for which Reinhart and Rogoff, and 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger agree in their de facto classification, we can broadly confirm our 
results. As discussed in section II, we nevertheless consider the Reinhart and Rogoff de facto 
classification the more appropriate for our questions.  
Interpretation of the empirical evidence 
To interpret these findings, it is essential to first go back to the two fundamental insights of the 
descriptive analysis above. First, there is a clear tendency for countries to announce either a 
fixed or floating exchange rate regime. This move to the corners of the exchange rate flexibility 
spectrum, however, is not mirrored in actual intervention strategies. Countries with a higher 
degree of de jure financial openness and countries that cross a critical level of financial market 
development will tend to intervene more than announced. At the same time, higher inflation and 
a higher share of primary commodities make it more likely that countries allow their exchange 
rate to float more than announced.  
Second, the tendency towards announcing extreme exchange rate regimes goes hand in hand 
with a tendency towards de facto intermediate regimes. Countries for which an intermediate 
exchange rate regime would be the optimal choice face the following problem. Intermediate 
                                                 
49 The overall frequency of ILA and IMA is reduced from 22 to 7 per cent and from 18 to 13 per cent, respectively. 
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exchange rate regimes have the reputation of being highly vulnerable to crises50. Partly as a 
consequence, communicating intermediate regimes is complicated: In principle, policymakers 
could announce the parameters that will guide day-to-day policy decisions, for example through 
publication of the threshold levels of shocks that will trigger intervention. This, however, 
involves substantial communication risks since the states of the world that would have to be 
specified ex ante would be too large to be effectively displayed in a transparent manner. In 
addition, communicating the intermediate nature of the regime would reduce its benefits 
substantially, since the desired flexibility would be reduced by any attempt to formalize the 
intervention strategy. Furthermore, there will be always situations in which the expectations 
created by a certain regime announcement will be frustrated. A policymaker aware of this might 
want to choose a communication framework that does not aim at preventing the impossible, but 
at providing a suitable framework for explaining deviations. It may therefore be a viable 
alternative to announce a floating or fixed exchange rate regime as benchmark to explain policy 
deviations against a clear arrangement. Put differently, since ambiguity cannot be avoided, the 
policymakers task will be to manage it appropriately. Financial markets and the public might not 
even be averse to such an approach: For markets, ambiguities might actually represent 
opportunities worth exploring (Best, 2005).  
The announcement of a more flexible exchange rate regime than the one that is de facto 
implemented is more likely the more financially open and developed countries are. As countries 
develop (economically and financially), they increasingly benefit from flexible exchange rate 
regimes (Rogoff et al., 2003). Advanced (high income) countries often exhibit important nominal 
rigidities and rely on the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. At the same time, 
they generally do not have severe currency mismatch problems as financial instruments in their 
own currencies and adequate hedging instruments are available. Nevertheless, these countries 
may opt to choose IMA. The announcement of a free float may be central for signaling an 
advanced stage of development, while the high openness may require intervention on a regular 
basis to smooth exchange rate variations.  
                                                 
50 Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) find that for countries more integrated with international capital markets 
(developed and emerging market economies) pegged exchange rate regimes are more prone to currency crises than 
floating regimes (they use the IMF de facto regimes). However, intermediate exchange rate regimes are the most 
crisis prone independent of the degree of financial integration. 
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Countries at an intermediate level of financial development often face important currency 
mismatches51 and are confronted with large and volatile capital inflows, making a more active 
exchange rate intervention strategy more likely. At the same time these countries will usually 
prefer a communication strategy that exposes the financial systems ability to manage exchange 
rate risks on its own. Doing so conveys the economys ability to partly absorb external shocks 
without policy intervention, and may thus signal a certain degree of financial market 
development, and a relatively resilient macroeconomic environment. Closely related, IMA 
provides a tool for learning to float 52 as policymakers signal to financial markets the need to 
develop skills and instruments53 and, at the same time, intervene sufficiently to support weak and 
not fully developed markets. In this context, IMA may open a channel for reputation building by 
allowing the public to learn about policymakers abilities to stabilize the exchange rate in an 
otherwise market-determined system, either directly or through the stabilization of fundamentals 
that spill over to the exchange rate. It may in fact be easier to stabilize the exchange rate when 
the commitment to stabilization is not excessive due to the existence of escape clauses. Drazen 
and Masson (1994) show that announcing an overly tough policy stance towards exchange rate 
changes may force policymakers to maneuver the economy into a situation in which subsequent 
exchange rate changes become more difficult to avoid. If carrying out an announced tough 
                                                 
51 Currency mismatches in the economy are a prominent explanation for countries exhibiting fear of floating and, 
thus, a reluctance to let their exchange rate float freely. 
52 Countries have to fulfil certain criteria to be able to take fully advantage of a flexible exchange rate regime and 
usually it takes time and effort to achieve critical levels. For a discussion of recommendable prerequisites see, e.g., 
Duttagupta, Fernandez, and Karacadag (2004), Asici and Wyplosz (2003), and Hakura (2005). 
53 As domestic markets develop agents may be able (and willing) to borrow and save in domestic currency reducing 
the vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuations. Rigid exchange rate regimes provide implicit insurance against 
exchange rate fluctuations and, thus, hinder the development of hedging instruments. Consider a country with a 
high degree of liability dollarization. Policymakers will usually pursue a more active intervention strategy as 
exchange rate fluctuations may induce bankruptcies of firms (through balance sheet effects). However, this is 
generally not an ideal situation for countries and they may want to reduce their exposure to foreign currency risk to 
be able to pursue a more independent monetary or exchange rate policy. However, as long as market participants 
are confident that policymakers will actively stabilize the exchange rate, thus providing implicit or explicit insurance 
against exchange rate risk, there is no reason for them to hedge their exposure. Thus, in order to induce firms to 
reduce their exchange rate risks, policymakers may want to follow a communication strategy which increases the 
uncertainty in the foreign exchange market sufficiently (by not making an active exchange rate management explicit, 
for example) to induce market participants to reduce their foreign currency risk exposure either by hedging or the 
choice of the currency denomination of assets and liabilities but without exposing the economy to full market 
forces. Kamil (2006) shows that the transition from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime may induce firms to 
hedge or limit their exposure to foreign currency risk. 
 
 29
policy has lasting effects on the underlying policy trade-off, the signaling benefits of such a 
strategy may be outweighed by the now larger cost of continuing to be tough. 
Furthermore, middle income countries have been particularly prone to banking and twin crises, 
especially with rigid exchange rate regimes54, and may thus be very cautious in providing any 
kind of explicit target. Clear exchange rate targets may not only trigger speculative attacks but 
also distort investment and borrowing decisions. High capital flows combined with financial and 
institutional weaknesses may exacerbate these distortions. If the perceived risk level is high, 
frequent and sudden reversals of capitals are not unusual and may be triggered by minor 
events55. However, exchange rate fluctuations may be perceived as increasing the overall risk of a 
country calling for an active exchange rate management. Thus, middle income countries may 
find themselves facing a difficult policy dilemma to which IMA may provide a possible solution. 
Through the announcement of a flexible exchange rate regime, countries do not provide explicit 
guidance and thus no direct target for expectations. However, through active exchange rate 
management they limit the detrimental effects of large exchange rate fluctuations.   
An interpretation of the relation between primary commodity exports and ILA can be found in 
discussions on exchange rate policies in countries characterized by a predominant export staple. 
One the one hand, these countries are vulnerable to large changes in the terms of trade, which, 
in theory, would require the exchange rate to depreciate (appreciate) after large negative 
(positive) shocks. On the other hand, the respective economies face difficult trade-offs when 
choosing a nominal anchor other than the exchange rate. The tension between these two policy 
concerns has led some observers to propose non-standard exchange rate anchors, such as 
pegging the export price (Frankel, 2005). 
But trading off the need for flexibility and the degree of viability of the nominal anchor is not 
the only challenge for these countries. The respective economies are also vulnerable to dutch 
disease-type phenomena (e.g., Corden and Neary, 1982; van Wijnbergen, 1984): In order to 
diversify over the medium-term, policymakers may want to keep the real exchange rate at a 
                                                 
54 Twin crises have almost exclusively been an emerging market phenomenon (Rogoff et al. 2003). Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) show that twin crises typically occur in the aftermath of financial liberalization and that the 
coincidence of banking and currency crises is particularly costly.  
55 For a discussion of sudden stops, see e.g. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004). 
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competitive and stable level. However, if the country is experiencing high foreign capital inflows 
(e.g. due to booming primary commodity exports or large-scale remittances), this may lead to a 
steady real appreciation which threatens the competitiveness of other export sectors.56 A 
policymaker concerned about competitiveness may thus want to limit real appreciations by 
adjusting the nominal exchange rate accordingly. This policy, however, results in an increase in 
foreign reserves that, if not sterilized, will increase domestic money supply and tend to increase 
inflation.57
In many countries, the monetary challenges of such a policy are reinforced by two factors. First, 
money markets in the respective countries are often underdeveloped, effectively limiting the 
effectiveness of standard approaches to monetary management. Second, many of the large 
primary exporters are also heavily dependent on imports, and are thus characterized by a high 
pass-through from exchange rate to price changes. Both factors tend to increase the role of the 
exchange rate in stabilizing prices, and require authorities to provide clear signals with respect to 
the future level and volatility of the exchange rate (which are also important for emerging export 
sectors). It may thus be necessary to give clear guidance as to future exchange rate movements 
(especially in the short term), while preserving the flexibility to restore competitiveness (in the 
medium term). Put differently, the exchange rate is used to communicate with two different 
audiences. In specific circumstances, ILA may provide a way out of the policy dilemma. 
Through the announcement of a fixed exchange rate regime the policymaker can emphasize a 
willingness to maintain price stability, while using frequent parity realignments to avoid excessive 
real appreciations.58
As an, example, consider Botswana, a country that is considered by many as having successfully 
avoided dutch disease-type phenomena in the presence of large resource exports and for 
                                                 
56 High domestic inflation may have the same effect. 
57 The monetary expansion may be limited by (partial) sterilization. However, the viability of sterilization is 
questionable and may induce an increase in domestic interest rates, triggering further capital inflows. A possible way 
out of the dilemma may be to impose (temporary) capital controls.  
58 Given that these adjustments take place frequently, maybe in small steps, e.g. to smooth variations in the nominal 
exchange rate as well, the de facto exchange rate regime may be considered a relatively flexible one, resulting in ILA. 
In this specific context, the expression ILA may be misleading as policymakers are actually intervening more than 
announced although not to keep the nominal exchange rate stable but the real one. 
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which we observe ILA since 198059. Botswanas main stated policy goals are to maintain the 
inflation rate at reasonable levels, to promote external competitiveness, and to successfully deal 
with external shocks (IMF, 2004). It is interesting to note that the first goal can, in principle, be 
supported by nominal exchange rate stability while the second and third may require occasional 
exchange rate adjustments, which may partly explain Botswanas relative diversification 
successes. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
Our empirical analysis of discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate regimes 
indeed suggests that these discrepancies are systematic. Moreover, we identify a number of 
stylized facts. Most importantly, both types of discrepancies are clearly dominated by 
intermediate de facto policies. Since countries at the same time tend to communicate exchange 
rate regimes at the corners of the flexibility spectrum, inconsistencies emerge. 
Whether ILA or IMA is observed depends on country characteristics. For example, ILA appears 
to be related to high shares of primary commodity exports and low de jure and de facto financial 
openness. A potential explanation is that ILA offers a way to simultaneously achieve short-term 
nominal exchange rate stability while preserving medium-term flexibility. Additionally, crises 
situations and high inflation periods are associated with ILA. IMA, in turn, is a widespread 
phenomenon amongst countries with medium to high levels of economic and financial 
development and high financial openness. IMA may provide an instrument to signal and foster 
financial market development while insulating the economy from extreme financial and 
economic disruptions due to high exchange rate fluctuations. Finally, we observe a significant 
secular trend from ILA towards IMA which matches the movement towards financial 
liberalization60, the rapid development of financial markets, increasing capital mobility and 
financial integration, as well as of worldwide reductions in inflation rates. These developments 
coincide in many aspects with the individual country characteristics related with ILA and IMA. 
                                                 
59 According to the chronologies accompanying the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classifications, there was also a 
parallel market 1986-1996. 
60 See e.g. Kose et al. (2006) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003). 
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Our study provides novel insights into the empirical regularities related to discrepancies between 
de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. A theoretical analysis of our findings is left for future 
research. There is still significant work to be done to improve our understanding of the 
implementation and communication of exchange rate policies. Recently, countries have 
emphasized the benefits of bounded de facto flexibility combined with a well-defined 
communication strategy and have been successful in following this approach (inflation rates and 
the occurrence of crises have declined). One important manifestation is that the communication 
of explicit exchange rate targets is increasingly being substituted by the communication of 
explicit inflation targets. How exchange rate policies can be integrated into inflation targeting 
regimes is the subject of ongoing research. 
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APPENDIX 
Graph A1: Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies over time  all countries 
a. De jure exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
fixed intermediate flexible  
b. De facto exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
fixed intermediate flexible  
c. Regime discrepancies, 1973-2004 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
C ILA IMA
 
 38
Graph A2: Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies over time  high income countries 
a. De jure exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
fixed intermediate flexible  
b. De facto exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
fixed intermediate flexible   
c. Regime discrepancies, 1973-2004  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
C ILA IMA  
 
 39
Graph A3: Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies over time  upper middle income countries 
a. De jure exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004  
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Graph A4: Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies over time  lower middle income countries 
a. De jure exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004  
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Graph A5: Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies over time  low income countries 
a. De jure exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004  
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Graph 6: Exchange rate regime discrepancies, financial openness and world inflation 
a. De jure financial openness 
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Table A1: Country coverage 
High income  Upper middle income  Lower middle income  Low income 
Australia Antigua & Barbuda Albania Benin 
Austria Argentina* Algeria Burkina Faso 
Belgium Botswana Armenia Burundi 
Canada Chile* Azerbaijan Cameroon 
Cyprus Costa Rica Belarus Central African Rep. 
Denmark Czech Republic* Bolivia Chad 
Finland Dominica Brazil* Cote D'Ivoire 
France Equatorial Guinea Bulgaria Gambia 
Greece Estonia China, P.R.* Ghana 
Hong Kong Gabon Colombia* Guinea 
Iceland Grenada Dominican Republic Guinea-Bissau 
Ireland Hungary* Ecuador Haiti 
Israel* Latvia Egypt* India* 
Italy Lebanon El Salvador Kenya 
Japan Libya Georgia Kyrgyz Republic 
Korea* Lithuania Guatemala Lao P.D.R. 
Kuwait Malaysia* Guyana Lesotho 
Luxembourg Mauritius Honduras Liberia 
Malta Mexico* Indonesia* Madagascar 
Netherlands Panama Iran, I.R. of Malawi 
New Zealand Poland* Iraq Mali 
Norway Russia* Jamaica Mauritania 
Portugal Slovak Republic Jordan* Moldova 
Singapore South Africa* Kazakhstan Myanmar 
Slovenia St. Kitts & Nevis Morocco* Nepal 
Spain St. Lucia Paraguay Nicaragua 
Sweden St.Vincent & Grenadines Peru* Niger 
Switzerland Turkey* Philippines* Nigeria 
United Kingdom Uruguay Romania Pakistan* 
United States Venezuela* Sri Lanka* Senegal 
  Suriname Tajikistan 
  Swaziland Tanzania 
  Syrian Arab Republic Togo 
  Thailand* Uganda 
  Tunisia Zambia 
  Turkmenistan Zimbabwe 
  Ukraine  
The distinction between income groups follows the World Bank methodology which is based on GNI per capita in USD. Countries are 
categorized as of their status in 2004. Low income countries are those with a GNI per capita < 825 USD, lower middle income with 826- 3,255 
USD, upper middle income with 3,256- 10,065 USD and high income countries > 10,065 USD. Countries with a star (*) are emerging market 
economy as defined by the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index. 
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Table A2: Exchange rate regimes 
 
 
De jure exchange rate regimes, 
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) 
 
De facto exchange rate regimes, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Fixed 
Dollarized  
Currency board  
Monetary union to outside (CFA) or 
inside (EMU) set of countries 
Single currency peg 
Published basket peg (SDR or non-
SDR) 
No separate legal tender 
Pre announced peg or currency board 
arrangement 
Pre announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
De facto peg 
Intermediate 
Secret basket peg 
Cooperative system (EMS or 
predecessor) 
Crawling peg 
Target zone 
Unclassified rule-based intervention 
Managed float with heavy 
intervention 
Unclassified managed float 
Other floats 
Pre announced crawling peg 
Pre announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
De facto crawling peg 
De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
Pre announced crawling band that is 
wider than or equal to +/-2% 
De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-5% 
Moving band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both 
appreciation and depreciation over 
time) 
Managed floating 
Floating 
Float with light intervention 
Float with no intervention 
Freely floating 
Freely falling 
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Data issues 
 
The first example of a potentially misleading classification is related to the choice of reference 
currencies. To understand the potential measurement errors resulting from an inadequate 
approach, consider as an example Germany. Its de jure exchange rate regime was classified as 
cooperative system (EMS or predecessor) during 1973-1998 and, thus, as intermediate regime. 
However, the de facto regime is classified as freely floating by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as 
they use the USD (instead of a basket of the other European currencies relative to which the 
announcement is made) as reference currency61. Thus, during 1973-1998, Germany displays ILA, 
even though there was neither unwillingness nor inability to stick to the announced policy. In 
fact, with 25 years of ILA, Germany belongs to the small country group in which ILA has been 
observed nearly throughout the sample period. To account for this problem, we drop Germany 
from our sample.62
A second interesting finding along these lines is that the classification choice for de jure secret 
basket pegs can significantly affect the results by increasing the occurrence of ILA substantially: 
When secret basket pegs are included in the fixed exchange rate regimes (as it is standard in the 
literature, e.g. in Ghosh et al. (2002), Alesina and Wagner (2006), and von Hagen and Zhou 
(2006)), the overall share of ILA increases63. Indeed, nearly all secret basket peg observations (87 
per cent64) are associated with intermediate de facto regimes. Secret basket pegs are exchange 
rate regimes where the national currency is pegged to a basket of at least two currencies based 
on country-specific criteria with the weights of the currencies and/or the composition of the 
basket being secret and possibly variable (Ghosh et al. (2002)). Secret basket pegs are special in 
the sense that, depending on policy implementation, they can be either considered fixed or 
intermediate regimes. If we regard easy verifiability of the exchange rate regime a distinguishing 
                                                 
61 Also Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) use the USD as reference currency for Germany (see Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003b)) and come to the same conclusion, that the exchange rate regime was a floating one until 
1998. 
62 Note that all numerical statements made in this paper refer to the sample when Germany is excluded and secret 
basket pegs are included in the intermediate exchange rate category except noted otherwise. 
63 The detailed de jure classification is only available until 1999. The share of ILA until 1999 is 24 per cent with 
secret basket pegs in the intermediate category and 33 per cent when included in the fixed regime, with 37 per cent 
in the 1970s and 22 per cent in the 1990s. 
64 This proportion refers to the period 1973-1999 due to data availability. 
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feature of fixed regimes as put forward by Frankel, Fajnzylber, Schmukler, and Serven (2001), 
then secret basket pegs are closer in nature to intermediate than to fixed regimes. A basket peg 
may have significant variations in the composition and relative weights of the included 
currencies. If, in addition, the composition or the relative weights are not public information, as 
it is the case for secret basket pegs, the exchange rate regime may be very difficult or even 
impossible to verify in a reasonable amount of time. Specifically, the exchange rate regime may 
be perceived as intermediate without implying a diverging announcement and intervention 
policy. 
As an interesting illustration, consider Malta, which announced a basket peg the composition of 
which was secret until 1997 and published thereafter. During the same time, the country 
followed a de facto narrow mowing band. If the composition and the relative weight of 
currencies in the basket change frequently without this being public information, the exchange 
rate may indeed be fixed to a difficult-to-infer central parity and appear as floating in a narrow 
band around some reference currency (in the case of Malta, first the UK pound, then the DM 
and finally the Euro)65. If we categorize secret basket pegs as fixed, we would classify all the 
observations as ILA, if we consider them as pertaining to the intermediate category, we would 
have consistent regime combinations until 1997. Thus, by including the secret basket pegs into 
the de jure intermediate regime category we get a more accurate picture of exchange rate regime 
choices while being more conservative in favor of consistent regime combinations. 66
 
                                                 
65 Malta has not been classified by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 
66 Von Hagen and Zhou (2006) and Alesina and Wagner (2006) include secret basket pegs into the fixed regimes. 
Carmignani et al. (2006) give no clear statement about their exchange rate regime classifications and the groupings 
used.  
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Table A3: Data sources 
 
Variable Source 
 
Exchange rate regimes: 
 
de jure Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002), AREAER (various issues), 
Information of national authorities and international institutions 
de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), 
http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reinhart/annual1.dta
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006), 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/updated_rr_nat_class.pdf
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), 
http://200.32.4.58/~ely/Base_2005.zip. 
 
Financial openness: 
 
de jure Chinn and Ito (2006), 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/kaopen_2005.xls
de facto Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip
and authors calculations: 
(external assets + external liabilities)/GDP [in USD] 
 
Macroeconomic indicators: 
CPI inflation rate International Financial Statistics 
GDP per capita  
(in PPP) 
World Economic Outlook 
Population International Financial Statistics 
 
Primary commodity 
exports 
World Development Indicators and authors' calculation 
Terms of trade 
volatility 
World Economic Outlook and authors' calculations: Terms of trade 
growth, 3 year centered standard deviation 
Trade concentration Ghosh Gulde, and Wolf (2002); Direction Of Trade Statistics 
Trade openness World Economic Outlook and authors' calculations: 
(exports + imports)/GDP 
 
Currency crises 
 
Glick and Hutchison (2001) 
Institutional quality The PRS Group, Inc., 1979-2006, East Syracuse, NY 13057 USA.  
Regional dummies World Bank 
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Table A4a: Distribution of regime discrepancies by Regions and Country Groups  ILA 
 ILA Overall Share P(ILA|de jure=fixed) 
East Asia & Pacific* 70 221 31.7% 74.7% 
Europe & Central Asia* 69 281 24.6% 35.5% 
Latin America & Caribbean* 224 884 25.3% 30.1% 
Middle East & North Africa* 133 314 42.4% 78.3% 
South Asia* 29 118 24.6% 58.0% 
Sub-Saharan Africa* 171 975 17.5% 20.4% 
OECD 122 860 14.2% 47.0% 
OPEC 103 248 41.5% 80.5% 
Transition countries 85 323 26.3% 50.6% 
Developing countries 533 2119 25.2% 31.9% 
Emerging market economies 183 738 24.8% 57.6% 
Advanced countries 96 877 10.9% 40.7% 
Developing countries (time-varying) 667 2530 26.4% 35.2% 
EMEs (time-varying) 50 363 13.8% 42.9% 
Advanced countries (time-varying) 95 841 11.3% 40.4% 
Low income countries 233 1,040 22.4% 27.9% 
Lower middle income countries 287 952 30.1% 58.8% 
Upper middle income countries 176 801 22.0% 24.4% 
High income countries 116 941 12.3% 44.6% 
Low income countries (time-varying)67 228 1034 22.1% 30.4% 
Lower middle income countries  
(time-varying) 305 1222 25.0% 37.2% 
Upper middle income countries  
(time-varying) 168 651 25.8% 38.0% 
High income countries (time-varying) 111 827 13.4% 44.7% 
All observations 812 3734 21.7% 36.0% 
     *Only low and middle income countries are included.  
 
 
                                                 
67 We use the historical country classification of the World Bank since 1987 and changes in lending categories for 
the preceding years to account for changes in income levels of countries over time (available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls). 
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Table A4b: Distribution of regime discrepancies by Regions and Country Groups  IMA 
 IMA Overall Share P(IMA|de jure=floating) 
East Asia & Pacific* 61 221 27.6% 75.5% 
Europe & Central Asia* 54 281 19.2% 52.0% 
Latin America & Caribbean* 109 884 12.3% 70.5% 
Middle East & North Africa* 39 314 12.4% 72.7% 
South Asia* 21 118 17.8% 100.0% 
Sub-Saharan Africa* 95 975 9.7% 58.4% 
OECD 305 860 35.5% 68.6% 
OPEC 10 248 4.0% 36.4% 
Transition countries 62 323 19.2% 56.4% 
Developing countries 230 2119 10.9% 63.5% 
Emerging market economies 152 738 20.6% 62.6% 
Advanced countries 294 877 33.5% 71.0% 
Developing countries (time-varying) 272 2530 10.8% 62.3% 
EMEs (time-varying) 126 363 34.7% 66.4% 
Advanced countries (time-varying) 278 841 33.1% 70.8% 
Low income countries 113 1040 10.9% 58.7% 
Lower middle income countries 188 952 19.7% 70.7% 
Upper middle income countries 78 801 9.7% 61.9% 
High income countries 297 941 31.6% 67.7% 
Low income countries (time-varying) 139 1034 13.4% 58.2% 
Lower middle income countries 
(time-varying) 190 1222 15.5% 69.2% 
Upper middle income countries 
(time-varying) 58 651 8.9% 67.2% 
High income countries (time-varying) 289 827 34.9% 68.3% 
All observations 676 3734 18.1% 65.7% 
     *Only low and middle income countries are included.  
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 Table A5: ILA  tests for equality of means, medians, and distributions 
all observations Mean 
  ILA=1 ILA=0 
t-test(1) Median test(2) Mann-Whitney test(3) 
Macro         
GDP per capita (PPP) 4271.1 6830.9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Population 35.7 36.6 0.852 0.074 0.000 
CPI Inflation 107.5 23.0 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Trade Regime         
Openness 0.6 0.9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trade Concentration 52.1 52.9 0.275 0.289 0.193 
Imports to GDP 0.3 0.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Primary Exports 34.7 25.6 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fuel Exports 20.3 11.9 0.000 1.000 0.033 
Institutions         
Bureaucratic Quality 1.8 2.4 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Accountability 3.3 4.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country Risk 58.1 67.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial Openness         
De Jure -0.9 0.3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
De Facto 1.0 2.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Mean conditional on de jure 
fixed regime ILA=1 ILA=0 t-test
(1) Median test(2) Mann-Whitney test(3) 
Macro         
GDP per capita (PPP) 4374.4 4859.3 0.122 0.000 0.197 
Population 36.7 14.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CPI Inflation 102.8 12.1 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Trade Regime         
Openness 0.6 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trade concentration 53.6 59.2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Imports to GDP 0.3 0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Primary Exports 37.6 27.8 0.000 0.372 0.000 
Fuel Exports 22.7 9.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Institutions         
Bureaucratic Quality 1.8 2.1 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Accountability 3.2 3.6 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Country Risk 59.0 66.2 0.000 0.048 0.000 
Financial Openness         
De Jure -0.9 0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
De Facto 1.1 3.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) The p-values are reported for the two means being different. The groups are not assumed to have equal 
variance. (2) Nonparametric test on the equality of medians testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being 
drawn from populations with the same median. The test chi-squared statistic is continuity corrected. (3) 
Nonparametric test on the equality of distributions testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being drawn from 
populations with the equal distribution. The p-values are reported for two-tailed tests and corrected for ties. 
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Table A6: IMA – tests for equality of means, medians, and distributions  
all observations Mean 
  IMA=1 IMA=0 
t-test(1) Median test(2) Mann-Whitney test(3) 
Macro         
GDP per capita (PPP) 9883.5 5478.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Population 56.5 31.9 0.001 0.000 0.000 
CPI Inflation 9.5 47.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trade Regime         
Openness 0.71 0.83 0.000 0.149 0.040 
Trade Concentration 50.8 53.1 0.007 0.001 0.001 
Imports to GDP 0.37 0.45 0.000 0.004 0.003 
Primary Exports 20.0 29.3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fuel Exports 7.8 15.1 0.000 0.577 0.153 
Institutions         
Bureaucratic Quality 2.7 2.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Accountability 4.5 3.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country Risk 71.4 64.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial Openness         
De Jure 0.94 -0.18 0.000 0.000 0.000 
De Facto 1.76 1.73 0.884 0.000 0.000 
      
Mean conditional on de jure 
flexible regime IMA=1 IMA=0 t-test
(1) Median test(2) Mann-Whitney test** 
Macro         
GDP per capita (PPP) 8538.1 8681.6 0.830 0.585 0.430 
Population 52.3 60.9 0.328 0.163 0.001 
CPI Inflation 9.4 143.0 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Trade Regime         
Openness 0.71 0.62 0.006 0.073 0.000 
Trade concentration 52.1 47.4 0.001 0.000 0.012 
Imports to GDP 0.38 0.34 0.022 0.483 0.001 
Primary Exports 20.6 25.1 0.028 0.234 0.145 
Fuel Exports 6.9 8.2 0.276 0.122 0.015 
Institutions         
Bureaucratic Quality 2.5 2.2 0.007 0.031 0.006 
Accountability 4.4 4.1 0.055 0.054 0.071 
Country Risk 69.2 64.3 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Financial Openness         
De Jure 0.93 0.68 0.063 0.031 0.039 
De Facto 1.72 1.28 0.000 0.076 0.000 
Notes: (1) The p-values are reported for the two means being different. The groups are not assumed to have equal 
variance. (2) Nonparametric test on the equality of medians testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being 
drawn from populations with the same median. The test chi-squared statistic is continuity corrected. (3) 
Nonparametric test on the equality of distributions testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being drawn from 
populations with the equal distribution. The p-values are reported for two-tailed tests and corrected for ties. 
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riab
le=
0 
96.
78%
 
96.
11%
 
97.
72%
 
55.
17%
 
99.
17%
 
96.
00%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
1  
50.
00%
 
48.
98%
 
50.
85%
 
90.
57%
 
26.
92%
 
21.
28%
 
Th
e c
od
ing
 of
 th
e d
epe
nd
ent
 va
riab
le i
s th
e f
ollo
win
g. (
1) 
ILA
 = 
1 i
f d
e ju
re 
reg
im
e m
ore
 rig
id 
tha
n d
e f
act
o; 
0 o
the
rw
ise
. (2
) C
on
dit
ion
al o
n d
e ju
re 
fix
ed 
reg
im
es:
 IL
A =
 1 
if d
e f
act
o 
int
erm
edi
ate
 or
 flo
atin
g; 0
 ot
her
wis
e. (
3) 
IM
A =
 1 
if d
e ju
re 
reg
im
e le
ss 
rig
id 
tha
n d
e f
act
o; 
0 o
the
rw
ise
. (4
) C
on
dit
ion
al o
n d
e ju
re 
flex
ible
 re
gim
es:
 IM
A =
 1 
if d
e f
act
o i
nte
rm
edi
ate
 or
 
fix
ed;
 0 o
the
rw
ise
. (5
) C
on
dit
ion
al o
n d
e fa
cto
 int
erm
edi
ate
: IL
A =
 1 i
f d
e ju
re 
fix
ed;
 0 o
the
rw
ise
. (6
) C
on
dit
ion
al o
n d
e fa
cto
 in
ter
me
dia
te: 
IM
A =
 1 i
f d
e ju
re 
flex
ible
; 0 
oth
erw
ise
.  
Ma
rgi
nal
 ef
fec
ts 
are
 re
po
rte
d. 
Ro
bu
st 
sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s a
re 
rep
ort
ed 
in 
par
ent
hes
es;
 * 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
10%
; *
* s
ign
ific
ant
 at
 5%
; *
** 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
1%
. G
DP
 pe
r c
api
ta 
(PP
P b
ase
d) 
and
 
po
pu
lati
on
 ha
ve 
bee
n i
ncl
ud
ed 
as 
add
itio
nal
 co
ntr
ols
 in
 all
 re
gre
ssio
n a
nd
 ye
ar 
and
 re
gio
nal
 du
mm
ies
 in 
(1)
 an
d (
3). 
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Ta
ble
 A9
: P
oo
led
 pr
ob
it e
stim
atio
ns 
for
 lo
we
r m
idd
le i
nco
me
 co
un
trie
s 
 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
 
(4)
 
(5)
 
(6)
 
 
ILA
 
ILA
 | 
de 
jur
e 
fix
ed 
IM
A 
IM
A |
 de
 jur
e 
flex
ible
 
ILA
 | 
de 
fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
IM
A |
 de
 fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
Op
enn
ess
 
0.5
33*
** 
0.8
13 
-0.
458
** 
-0.
520
 
0.2
13 
-0.
229
 
 
(0.1
45)
 
(1.3
34)
 
(0.2
15)
 
(0.6
61)
 
(0.2
87)
 
(0.3
21)
 
Pri
ma
ry 
com
mo
dit
y e
xpo
rts
 
0.0
02*
** 
0.0
14*
** 
0.0
01 
0.0
10*
* 
0.0
02*
** 
-0.
001
* 
 
(0.0
01)
 
(0.0
05)
 
(0.0
01)
 
(0.0
05)
 
(0.0
01)
 
(0.0
01)
 
Vo
lati
lity
 of
 ter
ms
 of
 tra
de 
0.2
17*
 
1.6
72*
** 
-0.
467
** 
-2.
718
** 
0.3
65*
* 
-0.
253
 
 
(0.1
22)
 
(0.5
83)
 
(0.1
85)
 
(1.1
88)
 
(0.1
43)
 
(0.1
63)
 
Im
po
rts 
to 
GD
P 
-0.
962
***
 
-2.
550
 
0.6
73*
 
1.3
79 
-0.
684
 
0.4
00 
 
(0.2
99)
 
(2.0
92)
 
(0.3
96)
 
(1.4
10)
 
(0.4
92)
 
(0.5
62)
 
Lag
ged
 in
flat
ion
 ra
te 
-6.
395
e-0
5**
* 
-1.
201
e-0
4 
-3.
905
e-0
4 
-7.
342
e-0
4 
2.3
39e
-04
** 
-1.
717
e-0
4 
 
(1.7
74e
-05
) 
(2.5
86e
-04
) 
(2.4
77e
-04
) 
(9.8
16e
-04
) 
(1.0
43e
-04
) 
(1.2
82e
-04
) 
Lag
ged
 hi
gh 
inf
lati
on
 du
mm
y 
0.5
68*
** 
0.1
70 
-0.
073
** 
-0.
441
** 
0.1
31 
0.2
57*
 
 
(0.1
00)
 
(0.1
76)
 
(0.0
33)
 
(0.1
74)
 
(0.1
49)
 
(0.1
47)
 
Lag
ged
 de
 jur
e fi
nan
cia
l o
pen
nes
s 
-0.
117
***
 
-0.
524
***
 
-0.
020
* 
0.0
02 
-0.
129
***
 
0.0
91*
** 
 
(0.0
16)
 
(0.1
35)
 
(0.0
12)
 
(0.0
34)
 
(0.0
17)
 
(0.0
15)
 
Lag
ged
 de
 fac
to 
fin
anc
ial 
op
enn
ess
 
-0.
142
***
 
-0.
148
 
0.0
16 
0.0
52 
0.0
20 
-0.
014
 
 
(0.0
36)
 
(0.2
43)
 
(0.0
11)
 
(0.1
21)
 
(0.0
41)
 
(0.0
50)
 
MS
CI
 du
mm
y 
0.1
81*
* 
0.7
88*
** 
0.1
58*
** 
0.1
05 
0.2
12*
* 
0.2
65*
** 
 
(0.0
73)
 
(0.0
91)
 
(0.0
57)
 
(0.1
11)
 
(0.0
92)
 
(0.0
75)
 
Ob
ser
vat
ion
s 
682
 
245
 
682
 
160
 
437
 
437
 
Pse
ud
o R
-sq
uar
ed 
0.4
1 
0.7
0 
0.3
4 
0.4
8 
0.3
0 
0.2
1 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d 
84.
75%
 
93.
47%
 
82.
26%
 
88.
75%
 
80.
32%
 
79.
18%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
0 
91.
83%
 
91.
67%
 
93.
47%
 
63.
64%
 
91.
41%
 
90.
71%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
1  
63.
10%
 
94.
89%
 
45.
96%
 
95.
28%
 
47.
75%
 
46.
49%
 
Fo
r th
e c
od
ing
 of
 th
e d
epe
nd
ent
 va
riab
le s
ee 
tab
le A
8. 
Ma
rgi
nal
 ef
fec
ts a
re 
rep
ort
ed.
 Ro
bu
st s
tan
dar
d e
rro
rs 
are
 re
po
rte
d i
n p
are
nth
ese
s; *
 sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
10%
; **
 sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
5%
; **
* 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
1%
. G
DP
 pe
r c
api
ta 
(PP
P b
ase
d) 
and
 po
pu
lati
on
 ha
ve 
bee
n i
ncl
ud
ed 
as 
add
itio
nal
 co
ntr
ols
 in
 all
 re
gre
ssio
n. 
Ye
ar 
du
mm
ies
 ar
e in
clu
ded
 in
 (1
), (
2), 
and
 (3
) a
nd
 re
gio
nal
 
du
mm
ies
 in
 (1
) to
 (4
). 
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Ta
ble
 A1
0: P
oo
led
 pr
ob
it e
stim
atio
ns 
for
 up
per
 m
idd
le i
nco
me
 co
un
trie
s 
 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
 
(4)
 
(5)
 
(6)
 
 
ILA
 
ILA
 | 
de 
jur
e 
fix
ed 
IM
A 
IM
A |
 de
 jur
e 
flex
ible
 
ILA
 | 
de 
fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
IM
A |
 de
 fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
Op
enn
ess
 
-0.
181
 
-0.
640
***
 
-0.
302
** 
-7.
462
***
 
-0.
285
** 
-0.
100
 
 
(0.1
71)
 
(0.2
24)
 
(0.1
28)
 
(2.6
73)
 
(0.1
36)
 
(0.4
17)
 
Pri
ma
ry 
com
mo
dit
y e
xpo
rts
 
-1.
138
e-0
4 
-6.
728
e-0
5 
-4.
401
e-0
4 
0.0
10 
0.0
01*
 
-0.
005
***
 
 
(5.3
06e
-04
) 
(1.0
72e
-03
) 
(4.3
02e
-04
) 
(0.0
06)
 
(0.0
00)
 
(0.0
01)
 
Vo
lati
lity
 of
 ter
ms
 of
 tra
de 
-0.2
20*
* 
-0.
459
 
0.0
83 
0.6
73 
-0.
034
 
0.0
91 
 
(0.1
08)
 
(0.3
29)
 
(0.0
68)
 
(0.5
16)
 
(0.0
42)
 
(0.1
49)
 
Im
po
rts 
to 
GD
P 
0.1
54 
0.9
02*
** 
0.4
84*
* 
14.
610
***
 
0.4
29*
 
-0.
593
 
 
(0.3
08)
 
(0.3
05)
 
(0.2
31)
 
(5.0
46)
 
(0.2
35)
 
(0.8
09)
 
Lag
ged
 in
flat
ion
 ra
te 
3.2
73e
-05
 
-2.
678
e-0
4**
 
-3.
893
e-0
6 
0.0
18*
 
-0.
003
* 
-0.
005
* 
 
(4.5
06e
-05
) 
(1.2
45e
-04
) 
(4.0
86e
-05
) 
(0.0
09)
 
(0.0
02)
 
(0.0
03)
 
Lag
ged
 hi
gh 
inf
lati
on
 du
mm
y 
0.3
79*
** 
0.2
82 
-0.
050
** 
-0.
699
***
 
0.0
89 
0.2
51 
 
(0.0
83)
 
(0.2
71)
 
(0.0
20)
 
(0.2
11)
 
(0.1
87)
 
(0.3
15)
 
Lag
ged
 de
 jur
e fi
nan
cia
l o
pen
nes
s 
-0.
017
 
-0.
153
***
 
0.0
02 
0.1
44*
* 
-0.
013
* 
0.0
38*
* 
 
(0.0
11)
 
(0.0
38)
 
(0.0
08)
 
(0.0
72)
 
(0.0
07)
 
(0.0
18)
 
Lag
ged
 de
 fac
to 
fin
anc
ial 
op
enn
ess
 
-0.
061
***
 
-0.
007
 
-0.
042
***
 
0.1
56 
-0.
047
 
0.1
03*
* 
 
(0.0
23)
 
(0.0
13)
 
(0.0
14)
 
(0.1
73)
 
(0.0
35)
 
(0.0
50)
 
MS
CI
 du
mm
y 
0.0
41 
-0.
155
** 
-0.
059
** 
-0.
655
***
 
-0.
089
** 
0.1
15*
 
 
(0.0
48)
 
(0.0
63)
 
(0.0
29)
 
(0.1
56)
 
(0.0
40)
 
(0.0
59)
 
Ob
ser
vat
ion
s 
403
 
142
 
403
 
64 
191
 
191
 
Pse
ud
o R
-sq
uar
ed 
0.4
7 
0.6
1 
0.2
9 
0.4
7 
0.3
5 
0.1
9 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d 
86.
10%
 
90.
85%
 
87.
34%
 
82.
81%
 
92.
67%
 
83.
77%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
0 
92.
60%
 
92.
38%
 
97.
14%
 
70.
83%
 
97.
63%
 
97.
35%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
1  
64.
13%
 
86.
49%
 
22.
64%
 
90.
00%
 
54.
55%
 
32.
50%
 
Fo
r th
e c
od
ing
 of
 th
e d
epe
nd
ent
 va
riab
le s
ee 
tab
le A
8. 
Ma
rgi
nal
 ef
fec
ts a
re 
rep
ort
ed.
 Ro
bu
st s
tan
dar
d e
rro
rs 
are
 re
po
rte
d i
n p
are
nth
ese
s; *
 sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
10%
; **
 sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
5%
; **
* 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 1
%.
 G
DP
 pe
r c
api
ta (
PP
P b
ase
d) 
and
 po
pu
lati
on
 ha
ve 
bee
n i
ncl
ud
ed 
as 
add
itio
nal
 co
ntr
ols
 in
 all
 re
gre
ssio
n, y
ear
 an
d r
egi
on
al d
um
mi
es 
in 
(1)
 an
d (
3). 
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Ta
ble
 A1
1: P
oo
led
 pr
ob
it e
stim
atio
ns 
for
 hi
gh 
inc
om
e c
ou
ntr
ies
 
 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
 
(4)
 
(5)
 
(6)
 
 
ILA
 
ILA
 | 
de 
jur
e 
fix
ed 
IM
A 
IM
A |
 de
 jur
e 
flex
ible
 
ILA
 | 
de 
fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
IM
A |
 de
 fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
Op
enn
ess
 
-0.
113
 
1.7
28*
* 
-0.
250
 
4.4
75*
** 
-0.
174
** 
-0.
880
***
 
 
(0.0
72)
 
(0.8
50)
 
(0.3
19)
 
(1.2
74)
 
(0.0
77)
 
(0.1
59)
 
Pri
ma
ry 
com
mo
dit
y e
xpo
rts
 
1.5
68e
-04
 
0.0
29 
0.0
01 
-0.
003
 
2.5
18e
-04
 
0.0
02*
* 
 
(5.0
23e
-04
) 
(0.0
18)
 
(0.0
01)
 
(0.0
02)
 
(3.5
79e
-04
) 
(0.0
01)
 
Vo
lati
lity
 of
 ter
ms
 of
 tra
de 
-0.
096
 
-3.2
76*
* 
-2.
023
***
 
-2.
723
** 
-0.
083
 
-1.
430
***
 
 
(0.0
95)
 
(1.3
90)
 
(0.5
24)
 
(1.3
39)
 
(0.0
86)
 
(0.3
34)
 
Im
po
rts 
to 
GD
P 
0.1
23 
-1.
781
 
-0.
024
 
-7.
083
***
 
0.2
10*
 
1.1
34*
** 
 
(0.1
33)
 
(1.6
66)
 
(0.6
45)
 
(2.6
74)
 
(0.1
19)
 
(0.2
52)
 
Lag
ged
 in
flat
ion
 ra
te 
0.0
01 
0.0
23*
* 
-0.
004
 
0.0
12 
-0.
001
 
0.0
02 
 
(0.0
00)
 
(0.0
12)
 
(0.0
04)
 
(0.0
12)
 
(0.0
01)
 
(0.0
03)
 
Lag
ged
 hi
gh 
inf
lati
on
 du
mm
y 
-0.
051
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0
23)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lag
ged
 de
 jur
e fi
nan
cia
l o
pen
nes
s 
-0.
014
* 
-0.
167
* 
0.0
62*
** 
0.0
80*
* 
-0.
015
* 
0.0
62*
** 
 
(0.0
08)
 
(0.0
89)
 
(0.0
17)
 
(0.0
37)
 
(0.0
09)
 
(0.0
18)
 
Lag
ged
 de
 fac
to 
fin
anc
ial 
op
enn
ess
 
-0.
014
** 
-0.
253
***
 
0.0
30*
** 
0.1
80*
** 
-0.
006
 
0.0
86*
** 
 
(0.0
07)
 
(0.0
60)
 
(0.0
09)
 
(0.0
39)
 
(0.0
06)
 
(0.0
20)
 
MS
CI
 du
mm
y 
-0.
060
* 
0.0
23 
0.1
85*
** 
0.3
89 
0.0
10 
0.0
84*
* 
 
(0.0
33)
 
(0.1
04)
 
(0.0
37)
 
(0.2
74)
 
(0.0
16)
 
(0.0
35)
 
Ob
ser
vat
ion
s 
832
 
204
 
823
 
215
 
525
 
525
 
Pse
ud
o R
-sq
uar
ed 
0.1
8 
0.6
2 
0.2
2 
0.4
7 
0.2
2 
0.5
4 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d 
87.
98%
 
91.
67%
 
79.
34%
 
86.
98%
 
83.
24%
 
89.
14%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
0 
99.
18%
 
89.
57%
 
91.
44%
 
81.
33%
 
99.
54%
 
95.
09%
 
Per
cen
t co
rre
ctly
 pr
edi
cte
d f
or 
dep
end
ent
 va
riab
le=
1  
2.0
8%
 
94.
38%
 
49.
79%
 
90.
00%
 
0.0
0%
 
72.
46%
 
Fo
r th
e c
od
ing
 of
 th
e d
epe
nd
ent
 va
riab
le s
ee 
tab
le A
8. 
Ma
rgi
nal
 ef
fec
ts a
re 
rep
ort
ed.
 Ro
bu
st s
tan
dar
d e
rro
rs 
are
 re
po
rte
d i
n p
are
nth
ese
s; *
 sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
10%
; **
 sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
5%
; **
* 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
1%
. G
DP
 p
er 
cap
ita 
(PP
P 
bas
ed)
 a
nd
 p
op
ula
tio
n 
hav
e 
bee
n 
inc
lud
ed 
as 
add
itio
nal
 c
on
tro
ls 
in 
all 
reg
res
sio
n, 
yea
r 
du
mm
ies
 in
 (
1), 
(3)
, a
nd
 (
4).
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Ta
ble
 A1
2: O
ver
vie
w o
f e
stim
atio
n r
esu
lts 
(ta
ble
s A
8-A
11)
 
Va
ria
ble
 
ILA
 
ILA
 | 
de 
jur
e 
fix
ed 
IM
A 
IM
A |
 de
 jur
e 
flex
ible
 
ILA
 | 
de 
fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
IM
A |
 de
 fac
to 
int
erm
edi
ate
 
Inc
om
e g
rou
p 
Op
enn
ess
 
+ 
(+)
 
- 
- 
(-) 
(-) 
Lo
w 
 
+ 
(+)
 
- 
(-) 
(+)
 
(-) 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
 
- 
(-) 
- 
- 
- 
(-) 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
 
(-) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
- 
- 
Hi
gh 
- 
- 
- 
(-) 
(+)
 
(-) 
Lo
w 
+ 
+ 
(+)
 
+ 
+ 
- 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
(+)
 
+ 
- 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
Pri
ma
ry 
com
mo
dit
y 
exp
ort
s 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(-) 
(+)
 
+ 
Hi
gh 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(-) 
+ 
(+)
 
Lo
w 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
(-) 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
- 
(-) 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(-) 
(+)
 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
Vo
lati
lity
 of
 
ter
ms
 of
 tra
de 
(-) 
- 
- 
- 
(-) 
- 
Hi
gh 
+ 
+ 
(-) 
n.a
. 
(-) 
(+)
 
Lo
w 
+ 
(+)
 
- 
- 
(+)
 
+ 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
+ 
(+)
 
- 
- 
(+)
 
(+)
 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
Lag
ged
 hi
gh 
inf
lati
on
 
du
mm
y 
- 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
Hi
gh 
- 
- 
(-) 
- 
- 
(-) 
Lo
w 
- 
- 
- 
(+)
 
- 
+ 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
(-) 
- 
(+)
 
+ 
- 
+ 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
Lag
ged
 de
 jur
e 
fin
anc
ial 
op
enn
ess
 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
Hig
h 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
- 
Lo
w 
- 
(-) 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(+)
 
(-) 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
- 
(+)
 
- 
(+)
 
(-) 
+ 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
Lag
ged
 de
 
fac
to 
fin
anc
ial 
op
enn
ess
 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
Hi
gh 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
n.a
. 
Lo
w 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(+)
 
+ 
+ 
Lo
we
r m
idd
le 
(+)
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
Up
per
 m
idd
le 
MS
CI
 du
mm
y 
- 
(+)
 
+ 
(+)
 
(+)
 
+ 
Hi
gh 
No
te: 
the
 sig
ns 
of 
the
 m
arg
ina
l ef
fec
ts o
f th
e p
oo
led
 pr
ob
it e
stim
atio
ns 
are
 re
po
rte
d, s
ign
s a
re 
in 
par
ent
hes
is i
f th
ey 
are
 no
t st
atis
tica
lly 
sig
nif
ica
nt.
 
 
